Last week, I wrote about the ideology of globalism and how it underlies certain government policies. Managed trade agreements, international military adventurism, and amnesty for illegal immigrants all emanate from this ideology.

Yet globalism has a consequence that is, if we are to believe the rhetoric of its greatest proponents, entirely unintended. Globalists often label those of us who resist their schemes as “isolationist.” Yet it is, somewhat remarkably, the globalists themselves who promote policies that isolate our nation from the rest of the world.

In terms of modern politics, isolationism is not so much an approach to American foreign policy as it is the result of the policies enacted by proponents of globalism. From offensive statements about “Old Europe” (as differentiated from “New Europe”), necessitated by the desire to justify a military presence in Iraq, to conflicts at the WTO, the flowery rhetoric of the neo-conservatives often takes vicious turns when unrealistic policies meet with reality.

Each state has an assumed monopoly of force over a given territorial area, the areas varying in size in accordance with different historical conditions. Foreign policy, or foreign relations, may be defined as the relationship between any particular State, A, and other States, B, C, D, and the inhabitants living under those States. In the ideal moral world, no States would exist, and hence, of course, no foreign policy could exist. Given the existence of States, however, are there, any moral principles that libertarianism can direct as criteria for foreign policy? The answer is broadly the same as in the libertarian moral criteria directed toward the "domestic policy" of States, namely to reduce the degree of coercion exercised by States over individual persons as much as possible.

Before considering inter-State actions, let us return for a moment to the pure libertarian stateless world where individuals and their hired private protection agencies strictly confine their use of violence to the defense of person and property against violence. Suppose that, in this world, Jones finds that he or his property is being aggressed against by Smith. It is legitimate, as we have seen, for Jones to repel this invasion by the use of defensive violence. But, now we must ask: is it within the right of Jones to commit aggressive violence against innocent third parties in the course of his legitimate defense against Smith? Clearly the answer must be "No." For the rule prohibiting violence against the persons or property of innocent men is absolute; it holds regardless of the subjective motives for the aggression.